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Contracts: Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank: Re-evaluating the
"Christian Principle" of Tort Liability for Breach
of Good Faith
In 1977, the Oklahoma Supreme Court imposed tort liability upon an in-
surance company which did not pay policy proceeds promptly to its insured.I
The court held that the insurer breached not only the contract, but also the
"implied duty to deal fairly and act in good faith."' In a subsequent case,
the court held that insurers are subject to this tort liability in all contracts
with their insureds.3 However, the court held recently in Rodgers v. Tecumseh
Bank' that commercial lenders will not be subject to tort liability for breach
of this duty in their lending contracts.'
This note begins with a brief history of tort liability for breach of the duty
of good faith as it developed in the insurance context. Next, it analyzes Rodgers
and shows that there is no logical reason for imposing the possibility of this
tort liability upon all insurers while not similarly imposing it upon commer-
cial lenders. Finally, this note considers possible ways to protect the freedom
of contract while protecting each contracting party from egregious conduct
by the other.
Creation of a Tort from the Duty of Good Faith
The duty of good faith envelops a contract. It permeates every aspect of
the contract: both the common law6 and Uniform Commercial Code7 assume
that anyone who enters into a contract does so in good faith with the intent
to deal fairly with the other party.
The origins of tort liability for breach of this duty are firmly rooted in
insurance case law. At first, tort liability was imposed when the insurer
breached its duty of good faith to the insured by refusing, as the insured's
agent, to settle a third-party liability claim within the policy limits. Tort liability
for breach of the insurer's duty to promptly pay the contract benefits to the
insured himself evolved from this duty.
1. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977) (amended 1978).
2. Id. at 904.
3. McCorkle v. Great AtI. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981).
4. 756 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Okla. 1988).
5. Id. at 1226.
6. Every contract contains an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which
will destroy or injure other party's right to receive the fruits of contract. Wright v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Md., 176 Okla. 274, 277, 54 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1935) (citing Kirke LaShelle
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933)).
7. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-203 (1981) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."). Contracting parties may not disclaim
the duty of good faith, although they may set reasonable standards by which it can be measured.
12A OaA. STAT. § 1-102(3) (1981).
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The Original Tort: Bad-Faith Refusal to Settle a Third-Party Claim
Oklahoma's recognition of the tort for breach of the duty of good faith
evolved from a 1914 New York Court of Appeals case, Brassil v. Maryland
Casualty Co.8 Brassil had a $1500 liability insurance policy, in which the in-
surer agreed to defend him against third parties that he injured. After an
accident, the injured party offered to settle with Brassil for $1500. Brassil's
insurer refused to settle, choosing instead to litigate the claim. When judg-
ment was rendered against Brassil for $6000, his insurer refused to appeal.
Instead, the insurer offered to fulfill the contract by paying Brassil the $1500
contract benefits, but only if Brassil himself paid the $6000 judgment first.
Instead of paying the judgment, Brassil filed his own appeal, which he won.
He then sued his insurer for the cost of the appeal.9
The court held the insurer liable for the cost of the appeal.' 0 The cost of
the appeal was not a contract remedy-the court created a tort remedy for
the insurer's refusal to protect the insured's interest. The court recognized
there was no precedent for its holding, possibly because the insurer's attitude
was so unusually inequitable. The court noted that Brassil's success on ap-
peal indicated the strength of his original bargaining position. That strength,
in turn, made the insurer's refusal to settle appear even more onerous. The
court held that the contract was an adhesion contract, that the insurer had
inherent power over Brassil and that freedom from liability was the essence
of the bargain."1
The court reasoned that it would be a "reproach to the law" not to pro-
vide a remedy for so obvious a wrong.' 2 If the remedy could not be found
in the letter of the contract, it could surely be found in the contractual obliga-
tion which underlies all written agreements-the obligation to carry out in
good faith what is written.' 3 Therefore, while acknowledging that the duty
of good faith was a contractual obligation, the court created a tort for its
breach.
Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.' 4 established this new
tort in New Hampshire and extended the insurer's potential liability to in-
clude the full cost of the judgment against the insured. Douglas carried a
$5000 liability insurance policy to protect himself from claims by his employees.
After an employee was injured, the employee offered to settle for $1500, but
the insurer refused to settle. At trial, the employee was awarded $13,500.
Thereafter, Douglas sued his insurer."
The New Hampshire supreme court held the insurer liable to Douglas for
8. 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1914).
9. Id., 104 N.E. at 622-23.
10. Id. at 624.
11. Id. at 623-24.
12. Id. at 624.
13. Id.
14. 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
15. Id., 127 A. at 709.
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the full amount of the award, even though the award exceeded the policy
limit.' 6 Contract damages would have been limited to the $5000 contracted
by the parties, no matter what the actual judgment award to the injured third
party. The court re-emphasized the power of the insurer over the insured by
noting that the insurer acted not only as the agent of the insured but also
on behalf of its own potentially adverse interest in negotiations with other
parties.' 7 Because of this potential conflict of interest, the insurer was held
to a standard of closer scrutiny than that of an ordinary agent.' 8 The court
cited Brassil for its reasoning that the insurer had breached the duty of good
faith which underlay the contract. 19
Most courts, including those in Oklahoma, hold the insurer liable for the
full cost of the settlement if the insurer refuses in bad faith to settle within
the policy limits.2" Some courts extend the liability to include other tort
damages. 2' However, the courts frequently do not fully distinguish between
tort and contract. Instead they often consider the duty breached to be both
a contract duty and a duty of agency which exists outside the contract.22
The Modern Tort: Bad-Faith Refusal to Pay Benefits to the Insured
In 1970, a California appellate court extended tort liability to breach of
a contract duty which did not involve the agency responsibility-the duty to
pay policy proceeds promptly to the insured. In Fletcher v. Western National
Life Insurance Co.,23 Fletcher, a father of eight, bought disability insurance
to protect his family. After an injury left Fletcher disabled, the insurer withheld
his policy benefits without good cause, but finally paid them. Because of the
delay, Fletcher and his family suffered both emotionally and financially.
24
16. Id.
17. Id. at 711.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 712.
20. Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, P.2d 916 (1935), establishing liability
for the judgment in Oklahoma. See, e.g., Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136 (1954) (defining the duty); Annotation, Liability of Indemnity
or Liability Insurer to Insured in Respect of Recovery by Injured Person Against Insured in
Excess of the Amount of the Policy or Upon a Ground Not Covered By the Policy, 131 A.L.R.
1499 (1941).
21. Damages beyond the full cost of settlement were first awarded in Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). In Crisci,
the plaintiff attempted to pay the judgment herself before she sued the insurer. In the process
she became indigent and suffered physically and mentally. In addition to the full amount of
the judgment against her, the court awarded an additional amount for her own suffering. In
doing so, the court overruled prior case law to the contrary. Id., 426 P.2d at 178.
22. In Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958), the court
allowed the plaintiff to recover tort damages, but allowed the action to proceed under the more
lenient statute of limitations which applied to actions "founded upon an instrument in writing."
Id., 328 P.2d at 203.
23. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
24. Id., 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83-88.
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Fletcher brought an action in tort for intentional infliction of severe emo-
tional distress because of the insurer's threatened and actual withholding of
disability benefits. The court found that the insurer's failure to pay did in-
deed cause severe emotional distress, but acknowledged that damages for emo-
tional distress are not recoverable in contract because they are too speculative.
2
1
The court then noted that if the action were in tort, damages for emotional
distress, and even punitive damages, could be awarded. It reasoned that the
duty of good faith imposed upon an insurer not only a duty to settle fairly
with a third party, but also a duty to promptly pay the policy proceeds to
the insured. 26 The court held, therefore, that refusal to promptly pay policy
benefits could support an action in tort for breach of the duty of good faith. 2"
The court allowed damages not only for emotional distress, but also for "inter-
ference with a protected property interest of its insured." 28
In justifying an award of tort damages, including punitive damages, the
court observed the "quasi-public" nature of insurance companies and the need
to protect the public from them. 29 The court recognized an implied-in-law
duty of the insurer toward the public, similar to that of public utilities. The
court considered this duty to be separate from the contract."
The Fletcher court also compared this tort to the tort of intentional in-
terference with a contract. 3 ' The court reasoned that the insured's interests
should be protected from interference by the insurer in the same way they
are protected from interference by a stranger to the contract. The insurer,
having a special duty of good faith, should be held to at least the same stan-
dard of conduct as a stranger. 2
Fletcher represented a significant departure from the holdings of earlier cases.
Here, there was no duty to represent the insured in dealings with third
parties-no duty of "agency" upon which to base the tort. 3  Instead, the con-
tracting parties had no more than the adversarial relationship common in con-
tract situations. 3' For the first time, the full range of tort remedies, including
punitive damages, was available for simple failure to perform in contract.
This new tort liability approached a form of strict liability. If the benefits
25. Id. at 92.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 95. The court held that punitive damages could be awarded if the breach of con-
tract was malicious, without cause and for the purpose of depriving the insured of his benefits.
But see RESTATEMENT (SEco N) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
30. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95. But see infra text accompanying
notes 85-90.
31. Id., 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
32. Id. at 94-95. The court's reasoning ignores a basic tenet of the tort-contract distinction:
the contracting parties can use the contract to protect themselves from each other, but it cannot
protect them from strangers to the contract.
33. See the reasoning of Douglas, supra text accompanying notes 14-19.




were not paid promptly, the insurer had the burden of proving that it had
good reason to delay. 5
In 1977, presented with facts similar to those of Fletcher, Oklahoma ac-
cepted without question the reasoning of the Fletcher decision. In Christian
v. American Home Assurance Co.,36 Christian became permanently and totally
disabled in an accident covered by his disability insurance policy. When he
presented proof of the accident to the insurer, the insurer refused payment,
offering no reason why benefits were denied. Christian sued the insurer for
breach of contract and sought the maximum disability benefits, plus interest.
Although the insurer defended its conduct vigorously, its lack of a valid defense
became obvious during the trial.37 The trial court held for Christian.38
Christian then filed a second action, this one in tort for breach of the duty
of good faith. He sought compensatory damages, damages for mental suffer-
ing and distress, punitive damages, and all attorney fees and litigation costs
of the prior action. In the second action, the trial court sustained the insurer's
motion for summary judgment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a tort action for breach of the duty of good faith exists in
Oklahoma.
3 9
The supreme court's reasoning closely followed that of Fletcher.4 The court
reasoned that the insurer was a quasi-public company in a special relation-
ship with its insured. The court did not respond to the insurer's argument
that the insurer did not have the agency relationship created by an insurer's
35. A discussion of the definitions of tortious behavior in this context is beyond the scope
of this note. Briefly, resort to judicial forum does not itself impute bad faith to the insurer.
Punitive damages are usually awarded only if the insurer has blatantly disregarded the insured's
rights. See, e.g., Buzzard v. McDanel, 736 P.2d 157, 160 (Okla. 1987) (the gravamen of the
claim is unreasonable, bad-faith conduct); Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760, 762
(Okla. 1984) (a Christian cause of action will not lie where there is a legitimate dispute; the
jury should view all facts); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 914 (Okla. 1982)
(evil intent to mislead or deceive is not necessary). See generally Note, The Insurer's Exploding
Bottle: Moving from Good Faith to Strict Liability in Third and First Party Actions, 46 Omo
ST. L.J. 157 (1985) (defining the duty).
36. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977) (amended 1978).
37. Id. at 900.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 904.
40. Id. at 901-902. The court also quoted from Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973), in which the California Supreme Court established
the official precedent for California. Gruenberg is generally recognized as the origin of the tort
in the United States. However, Fletcher appears to have been the first to impose tort liability
in the first-party context. Fletcher and Gruenberg are in complete accord.
Neither Fletcher nor Gruenberg addressed the fact that the duty breached was a simple con-
tract duty. Some states have refused to recognize the tort because it effectively allows tort damages
in contract. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149,
155 (Kan. 1980) (no agency relationship upon which to base a tort); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985) (tort approach requires analytical straining and poses potential
unforeseen consequences to the law of contracts). Others, including Oklahoma, have glossed
over the flaw, as the reasoning of Christian illustrates. See infra note 95.
1989]
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control of litigation against the insured.4 ' The court rejected the insurer's argu-
ment that, according to Oklahoma statute, 42 the remedy for breach of an
obligation to pay "money only" is the amount due with interest. 43 The court
rejected two federal court decisions4 4 which represented Oklahoma's prior con-
sistent rejection of tort damages in contract as being barred by 23 O.S. 1971
§§ 9 and 22.45 Instead, the court observed that the insurer had a statutory
duty to pay benefits promptly.
46
The tort established by Christian has become an established part of
Oklahoma case law. 47 The Oklahoma Supreme Court now appears to be focus-
ing on how best to control the application of Christian.
41. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
42. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 22 (1971).
43. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903.
44. Id. See Renfroe v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Okla. 1969)
(action for money damages only, under 23 OKLA. STAT. §§ 9, 22, and 96); Ledford v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Okla. 1970) (no punitive damages because action is based
on and arises out of contract). The Christian court distinguished these cases because they "presup-
pose that the obligation of an insurance company is for the payment of money only." 577 P.2d
at 903.
45. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 22 (1981) states that the remedy for breach
of an obligation to pay money only is the amount due, with interest. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9 (Supp.
1986) allows tort damages for "breach of an obligation not arising from contract."
46. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903. 36 Okla. Stat. § 4405(A)(8) (Supp. 1984) requires that all
individual accident and health policies contain a standard clause stating that indemnities will
be paid as soon as the insurer receives written proof of the loss, while 36 OKLA. STAT. § 4505
(1981), extends this protection to beneficiaries of group policies.
The Christian court's observation that the insurer had a statutory duty to pay benefits promptly
was in error. The referenced statutes required only that the insurer promise to pay the proceeds
promptly. To require by statute that the insurer promise to pay the contracted benefit may have
indeed imposed a duty outside the contract upon which to base tort liability, but that duty was
to make the promise, not to pay the benefits. But see 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1222 (1986), which
requires an insurer to settle claims in good faith. This statute is part of the Unfair Claims Settle-
ment Practices Act (hereinafter "Act"), which does not provide a private cause of action. Instead,
the Act is enforceable by the Insurance Commissioner. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1219 (1986) now pro-
vides recovery in contract for failure to pay policy proceeds promptly. See infra notes 98-104
and accompanying text.
47. For a recent application of Christian, see Everaard v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 842
F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1988). The tort has been the subject of extensive discussion. For prior com-
ment on Oklahoma's tort, see Note, Punitive Damages for Breach of an Insurance Contract,
3 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REv. 280 (1978) (examining the new tort); Woodard, Punitive Damages for
Bad Faith Breach of an Insurance Contract: It's Unconstitutional, 54 OKRA. B.J. 1125 (1983)
(questioning the constitutionality of singling out the insurance industry); Koss, The Constitu-
tionality of Awarding Punitive Damages Against an Insurance Company for Bad Faith: A Reply,
54 OKLA. B.J. 1999 (1983) (defending the constitutionality of the tort); Note, Tortious Breach
of Contract in Oklahoma, 20 TULSA L.J. 233 (1984) (discussing Oklahoma's conflict between
tort and contract); Note, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American
Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605 (1978) (discussing the elements of bad-faith breach).
For a general overview of the tort, see, e.g., Note, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Cove-
nant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1291 (1985) (justifying the
tort); Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94




Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank:"8
A Confusing Attempt to Limit Tort Liability in Contract
Oklahoma's application of Christian shows that the link between contract
and breach of the duty of good faith remains strong. Tort damages for breach
of the duty have been denied when no contract duty was owed to the com-
plaining party. For example, a plaintiff could not recover in tort because her
accident occurred before the effective date of her insurance policy, even though
the insurer unreasonably delayed acceptance of her application.49 Third parties
could not recover in tort for the insurer's refusal to settle with them. Plain-
tiffs could not recover in tort from the agent who sold them their policy,
because the agent was not a party to the insurance contract."
The remaining question, then, has been whether the Christian tort liability
for breach of the duty of good faith should apply to all contracts or only
to certain ones. Although the tort liability has been extended to all insurance
companies,5 2 it has been limited to insurance companies, with two exceptions."
In Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank,54 the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered
whether to impose this new tort liability upon lenders.55
Rodgers was an educated real estate investor whose company sought to pur-
chase Oklahoma County real estate.16 After shopping interest rates at several
48. 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988).
49. See Scivally v. Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101, 104 (10th Cir. 1983) (without a contract,
there is no implied duty upon which to base the cause of action). But see Djowharzadeh v.
City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 646 P.2d 616, 620 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied
(1982) (bank has the duty of good faith and fair dealing to not reveal the details of loan appli-
cant's plans).
50. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984) (clarifying Timmons v. Royal
Globe, infra at note 51). But see Roach v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 769 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1989) (third-
party beneficiary of life insurance policy has cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith).
51, See Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 912 (Okla. 1982) (duty to execute
the contract fairly and in good faith cannot be imposed upon a third party who is not a party
to the contract).
52. McCorkle v. Great Ati. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981). The court said explicitly,
"We affirm our position in Christian and hold that it applies to all types of insurance com-
panies." Id. Commentators have debated the constitutionality of this holding. See Woodard,
Punitive Damages for Bad Faith Breach of an Insurance Contract: It's Unconstitutional, 54 OK.A.
B.J. 1125 (1983) (questioning the constitutionality of singling out insurance companies for this
liability); Koss, The Constitutionality of Awarding Punitive Damages Against an Insurance Com-
pany for Bad Faith: A Reply, 54 OaLA. B.J. 1999 (defending the court's action). For further
interpretation of this holding, see infra note 78.
53. See EKE Builders, Inc. v. Quail Bluff Assoc., 714 P.2d 604, 609 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985)
(the same duty to act in good faith adheres to every contract); Smith v. Citizens Bank of Hugo,
732 P.2d 911, 913 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied (1987) (bank liable in tort for breaching
duty to deal honestly and fairly with its depositor). Cf. infra notes 128-31 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the court's refusal to extend the tort to termination-at-will employment
contracts.
54. 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988).
55. Id. at 1226.
56. The facts as stated here were compiled from conversations with the opposing attorneys
and from studying Rodgers' deposition and the briefs before the supreme court. The only published
opinion in the case was that of the supreme court; only minimal facts were given in that opinion.
1989]
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savings and loans, he approached the newly-established Tecumseh Bank for
a short-term loan. He arranged the financing about six weeks before closing,
assuming that the loan and mortgage would be for two years. However, at
closing, he found that the mortgage was for one year. To placate Rodgers,
the bank president inserted the following phrase into the contract: "Finalpay-
ment may be refinanced at any time it is due without penalty and at terms
no less favorable than original terms."
57
Nine months later, the bank had a new president. The new president notified
Rodgers that because the loan did not meet credit standards in its loan policy,
the bank could not extend or renew the mortgage." The president claimed
that the inserted phrase was added not to ensure extension of the loan, but
to persuade the borrowers to make their payments promptly so they might
get a renewal.
59
Rodgers found money elsewhere, paid off the loan to Tecumseh Bank, then
sued the bank for breach of contract and "tortious breach of contract," based
on a breach of the duty of good faith.6 1 As damages for breach of contract,
he asked for the $1650 increase in interest on the second loan plus costs. In
addition, he asked for $50,000 as punitive damages for breach of the duty
of good faith. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank and
the court of appeals affirmed.
6 '
By unanimous decision, the supreme court reversed and held that summary
judgment should be entered for Rodgers on the breach-of-contract action.
However, the court upheld summary judgment in favor of the bank on the
issue of tort liability.62 The court stated simply that the "borrowers ask us
to extend Christian to commercial loan agreements. We decline to do so
because of the inherent differences between insurance policies and commer-
cial loan agreements.
63
The court first summarized the prior applications of Christian.64 The court
noted that although the implied-in-law duty of good faith extended to all in-
surance contracts, the duty did not extend to strangers to the contract. 65 The
57. Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 1224 (emphasis by the court).
58. The bank claimed that it could not extend or renew the mortgage because both the land
and Rodgers' residence were outside the bank's prescribed loan trade territory. This complica-
tion was known, but not addressed, at the time the loan was made.
59. Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 1224.
60. Id.
61. Summary judgment was granted during a pretrial hearing the borrowers did not attend.
There was a serious question as to whether Rodgers' attorney had proper notice of the hearing.
Rodgers' petition for certiorari concentrated not on the tort/contract issues, but on whether
the summary judgment had been properly granted and on whether the court of appeals, by ad-
dressing facts which had not been argued below, had functioned as a trial court. See supra note 56.
62. Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 1227.
63. Id. at 1226.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982)). See also Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984) (clarifying Timmons). Compare this reasoning




court then stated that "Christian and its progeny, thus far, only apply against
insurers."66
The court's policy arguments were apparently straightforward comparisons
of this contract to insurance contracts. First, the court noted that, by its very
nature, an insurance policy is an adhesion contract.67 In contrast, Rodgers
shopped for favorable interest rates and successfully negotiated a "favorable"
term into the bank's form contract.68 The court described the Rodgers con-
tract as "arms-length negotiating, a relatively equal bargaining capacity and
no snares or traps for the unwary."6 9 The court considered that an insured
buys insurance to minimize risk, while the purpose of a commercial loan is
to facilitate risk-taking in business. 70 The court concluded that when no special
relationship exists between the parties, the parties should be able to contract
as they wish. "To impose tort liability on a bank for every breach of contract
would only serve to chill commercial transactions.1
71
The court then pointed out that limiting the application of Christian did
not leave contracting parties without remedy. The court noted that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing still existed in every contract under the common
law and under the U.C.C.72 The court also pointed out the common law op-
tion to forego the contract and sue in tort when there had been "gross
recklessness or wanton negligence" by a contracting party.
73
In summary, while the Rodgers court affirmed the validity of imposing tort
liability upon insurers for breach of the duty of good faith, it limited the
possibility that all contracting parties might become similarly vulnerable.
However, although the court held unequivocally that commercial lenders are
free from tort liability for breach of the duty of good faith, the holding was
not extended, as it logically could have been, to all lenders.
66. Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 1226. Because several lower courts had already extended the theory
to non-insurance contracts, the court was probably referring only to those cases which it had
reviewed. See supra note 53 for lower court decisions which have extended the tort liability beyond
the insurance context.




71. Id. at 1227.
72. Id. (citing Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985)). In Hall, a terminated
employee sued his former employer for breach of the duty of good faith, claiming that he had
been fired so that the employer would not have to pay him. Id. at 1028-30. Rodgers cited Hall
as an example of using common-law breach of the duty of good faith to get contract damages
(compensation for work completed), but not tort damages. Id. at 1227. Before Rodgers was
decided, however, the application of Hall was severely restricted by Hinson v. Cameron, 742
P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987). Hinson allowed no recovery, bolstering Oklahoma's termination-at-will
tradition. Id. at 554. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
73. Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 1227.
1989]
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Analysis
The Rodgers decision is consistent with both the common law and the
Uniform Commercial Code definitions of good faith as a contract duty.7 '
It is also consistent with Oklahoma statutes which expressly forbid tort damages
in contract."' The significance of this decision lies in the court's unsuccessful
attempt to distinguish it from the court's prior decision in Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co. to allow tort damages for breach of an in-
surance contract.
At first glance, Rodgers and Christian may seem easily distinguished. The
policy arguments expressed in Christian appear to be absent in Rodgers: (1)
insurance companies are quasi-public institutions, (2) because the insurance
contract is an adhesion contract, the insurer has inherent power over the in-
sured, and (3) freedom from liability is the essence of the bargain.", Even
if this distinction were valid, a third supreme court case, McCorkle v. Great
Atlantic Insurance Co.," would complicate the comparison. In McCorkle,
the court held that all Oklahoma insurers are subject to tort damages for
breach of the duty of good faith." Thus, McCorkle extended the tort liability
to contracts which no more fit the policy arguments of Christian than did
the contract in Rodgers.
Therefore, Christian, McCorkle, and Rodgers must be considered together.
Christian focuses on unequal bargaining power.7 9 McCorkle focuses on in-
surance contracts in general. 0 Rodgers focuses on the commercial lending
contract. 8 Two bases for possible distinction among these cases are evident.
First, are insurance contracts different from other types of contracts? Second,
are consumer contracts different from commercial contracts?
Insurance Contracts as a Separate Category
There are several reasons the Oklahoma courts may have wanted to limit
Christian to insurance contracts. Perhaps the courts distinguished insurance
74. See supra notes 6 & 7.
75. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 21 (1981).
76. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902.
77. 637 P.2d 583 (Okla. 1981).
78. Id. at 588. The question before the McCorkle court was whether Christian should apply
to a fire insurance contract in which the benefit amount to be paid was uncertain. Id. at 587.
Possibly the court intended only to extend Christian to all types of personal insurance, whether
or not the benefit amount was a fixed sum. Nevertheless, the Rodgers court affirmed that McCorkle
extended Christian to include "all types of insurance contracts," lending credence to the assumption
that the holding of McCorkle is indeed to be taken literally. Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 1226. Com-
mentators have debated the constitutionality of the McCorkle holding. See Woodard, Punitive
Damages for Bad Faith Breach of an Insurance Contract: It's Unconstitutional, 54 O"a. B.J.
1125 (1983) (questioning the constitutionality of singling out insurance companies for this liabili-
ty); Koss, The Constitutionality of Awarding Punitive Damages Against an Insurance Company
for Bad Faith: A Reply, 54 OxiA. B.J. 1999 (1983) (defending the court's action).
79. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902.
80. McCorkle, 637 P.2d at 588.




contracts because insurers are assumed to have a fiduciary duty to their in-
sureds. If fiduciary duty was the distinguishing factor, the courts stopped short
of such an explicit holding. The word "fiduciary" does not appear in Chris-
tian, McCorkle or Rodgers. Nor does it appear in Fletcher v. Western National
Life Insurance Co. " or its antecedents. Also, the agency duty to settle discussed
by the New Hampshire court in Douglas v. United States Fidelity Guaranty
Co." is not present in the duty to promptly pay a claim. As one court stated,
except for the duty to settle with third parties, the relationship between in-
surer and insured is adversary, not fiduciary. 4
Another possibility may be that the courts were emphasizing the quasi-public
nature of insurers. Public utilities and private companies performing public
service duties have long been held to a higher duty than the average contract-
ing party." However, the duty of a public utility to the citizenry generally
adheres even in the absence of a contract and extends beyond a contract. 8
In contrast, an insurance company has no general obligation to provide benefits
to the public"1 and no duty to the insured other than that for which it has
contracted." Banks, on the other hand, have been found to have a duty to
the public that extends beyond contracts with their customers. 89 In Djowhar-
zadeh v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 9 a bank was held to have a quasi-
public duty even though there was no contract and no fiduciary relationship.
The supreme court denied certiorari, leaving to question whether the court
would find this duty in all banking relationships.
Furthermore, the concepts of fiduciary duty and quasi-public duty must
be distorted considerably if they are to apply to commercial insurance con-
tracts. Large commercial entities may contract with their insurers in the same
types of arm's length transactions they have with their banks. The essence of
the bargain is protection from accidental loss, but the protection from ac-
cidental loss is itself a commercial advantage. In addition, the statutes which
require the insurer's promise to pay promptly do not apply to these commer-
cial insurance transactions. 9
Personal Contracts Versus Commercial Contracts
Perhaps the court, through Rodgers, is now saying, "caveat emptor" to
the individual bank customer. However, by restricting the Rodgers holding
82. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32.
83. 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708, 711 (1924). See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
84. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 155 (1980).
85. See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768 (1939).
86. See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 97 P.2d at 770.
87. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984) (no duty to third parties in-
jured by insured).
88. See Scivally v. Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1983) (duty of good faith not
breached even when insurer negligently delayed processing of application).
89. Harrell, The Bank-Customer Relationship: Evolution of a Modern Form?, 11 OU.JA. CrrY
U.L. REv. 641, 642 (1986).
90. 646 P.2d 616, 618 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied (1982) (a bank officer breaching
the confidentiality of a potential customer by revealing the details of a pending business deal).
91. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 4405(A)(8) (1984); 36 OKLA. STAT. § 4505 (1981). See supra note 46.
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to commercial loan agreements, the supreme court has left the door open
to imposing liability for breach of the duty of good faith in the personal bank-
ing contract and in other kinds of consumer contracts.
The policy concerns of Christian may be present in the relationship be-
tween individual customers and their banks.9" Although credit customers may
shop for the best deals, just as they might shop for an insurance company,
they may also be dealing with the bank specifically to avoid the risk. Loan
contracts, particularly mortgage contracts drawn up by the bank, can be filled
with fine print. Whatever negotiating power customers may have with their
banks, many customers may not realize that they have it.
However, Rodgers is an example of how even a sophisticated commercial
customer can be caught unaware. The court noted that Rodgers had a
"favorable term inserted into the printed form" contract. 93 The court did
not mention that this "favorable" term was the subject of the controversy.
The term was favorable to the borrowers only after litigation. The bank did
not intend that it be as favorable as it turned out to be. 94
Furthermore, even the distinction between commercial and consumer con-
tracts is not always clear. The purpose for which a contract is made does
not define the relative bargaining positions of the contracting parties. For
example, individuals who regularly enter contracts in the context of their work
will have the advantage of greater knowledge in their personal contracts.
Rodgers would have been no less sophisticated if his loan had been for a
car. On the other hand, the small business owner who must make commercial
loan contracts may be just as vulnerable as individual insured are with their
insurers.
The result of this analysis is that if Rodgers was intended to clarify the
application of Christian, it failed to do so. Neither the distinction between
insurance and non-insurance contracts nor the distinction between personal
and commercial contracts provides a clear or comfortable resolution of the
issues raised by Christian, McCorkle and Rodgers. This analysis does sug-
gest, however, that the Christian decision should be reviewed in light of the
confusion it has caused.
95
92. See supra text accompanying note 89.
93. Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 1226.
94. The bank president admitted that the term was never intended to assure that Rodgers
would get the two-year note that he thought he was getting. See supra note 56.
95. In Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered facts similar in all essential aspects to those of Christian. In question was Wisconsin's
tort for breach of good faith, which has the same roots as, and appears identical to, Oklahoma's
tort. The Court held unanimously that breach of the duty of good faith is no more than a con-
tract duty and that there is no duty outside the contract upon which to base tort liability. Id.
at 216-18.
The ultimate question before the Allis-Chalmers court was whether the action for breach
of the duty of good faith could be heard as a state tort action, or whether it was preempted
by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), as a contract





If the policy concerns of Christian are valid, logically the same remedy
should be available whenever these concerns are present in a contract. On
the one hand, whether the contract is for insurance or whether it is for com-
mercial gain should be of no consequence. In either case, the contract should
not be used as a shield from liability. On the other hand, if the policy con-
cerns of Rodgers are valid, the freedom to contract at arms length should
also be protected.
It appears uncontroverted that ordinary consumers tend to be disadvantaged
in contracts with their insurers. Most states, including Oklahoma, recognize
a tort action for breach of the duty of good faith in this context. 96 Some
states have refused to do so because they are reluctant to interfere with the
established distinction between tort and contract." There are, however, other
narrow preemptory effect of section 301: the action would be preempted only if it had no basis
outside the contract. Id. at 213, 220.
Christian and Allis-Chalmers cannot be reconciled. The normal tendency would be to reject
Allis-Chalmers because it is a labor law case. Because policy concerns of a particular context
can influence a court's reasoning, it can be dangerous to apply the holding or the reasoning
of a case out of context. However, in this situation, any skewing that the Supreme Court may
have done in Allis-Chalmers favors the validity of applying its holding to the present context.
Courts prior to Allis-Chalmers had tended to generally preempt any action related to the
labor contract. See, e.g., Coleman, Muddy Waters: Allis-Chalmers and the Federal Policy Favoring
Labor Arbitration, 44 WASH. & LE L. REv. 345 (1987). In Allis-Chalmers, the court sought
to limit preemption. 471 U.S. at 212. The substantial dicta in Allis-Chalmers has been used by
both that Court and other courts to allow state torts which depended upon the facts of the
contract. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988) (tort action
for wrongful discharge because of false worker's compensation claim not preempted).
The conflict between Christian and Allis-Chalmers is beyond the scope of this but is examined
critically in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck: Exposing the Fatal Flaw in the "Christian Principle" of
Tort Liability for Breach of Good Faith, 42 Okla. L. Rev. (winter issue in press) (1989). It is
unlikely that the Supreme Court would be willing to decide the tort/contract issue in the present
context. The Court admitted that the nature of a state's tort is a matter of state law. Allis-
Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 214. Nonetheless, the fact that Oklahoma courts have devised a fiction
to circumvent state statutes forbidding tort recovery in contract should be a matter of some
concern. In fact, that circumvention is the root of the problems addressed by this note.
96. A majority of states recognize the tort. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay,
525 So. 2d 1339 (Ala. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 863 (1988); O.K. Lumber v. Providence
Washington Ins., 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988); Filaski v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ariz.
591, 734 P.2d 76 (1987); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985); Grand Sheet Metal
Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428 (1977); Reynolds
v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 766 P.2d 1243 (Idaho 1988); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell,
712 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1986); Alarcon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 1989);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Macs, 516 So. 2d 495 (Miss. 1987); Tynes v. Bankers Life Co.,
730 P.2d 1115 (Mont. 1986); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d
638 (N.D. 1979); Staff Bldrs., Inc. v. Armstrong, 37 Ohio St. 3d 298, 525 N.E.2d 783 (1988),
reh'g denied, 38 Ohio St. 3d 718, 533 N.E.2d 788 (1988).
97. A small minority of states refuse to provide relief for the insured beyond a contract
action for the amount due. See, e.g., Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich.
401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Pillsbury Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 425 N.W.2d 244 (Minn.
1988), review granted (1988).
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ways to protect the insured. One solution is to provide an exclusive statutory
remedy for an insurer's bad faith. A second solution is to consider breach
of the duty of good faith a contract action, but be generous in the definition
of contract damages. Each of these approaches is discussed below. In addi-
tion, California's continuing attempt to define the tort is discussed.
Statutory Remedies
Although there was no equivalent statute in effect in 1977 when Christian
was decided, the Oklahoma Legislature provided in 1986 several statutory
remedies for an insurer's failure to pay policy proceeds promptly to its in-
sured. Oklahoma's Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act9" and Claims Resolu-
tion Act99 are part of the Insurance Code. These statutes are enforceable by
the Insurance Commissioner.'00 An insurer may be subject to a fine of $100
to $1000 for violation of the Claims Resolution Act'0 ' and risk losing its cer-
tificate of authority for violation of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices
Act. 102
In addition, a private cause of action is created when an insurer does not
pay a valid claim within sixty days of proof of loss.' °0 If litigation is necessary,
the insurer must pay interest at two points above the average Treasury Bill
rate until the claim is paid. Attorney's fees shall be awarded to the prevailing
party.'0 4 This remedy is clearly a contract remedy.
Several states have concluded that it is appropriate to limit the remedy to
that allowed by statute.105 For example, Kansas has statutory relief for in-
sureds similar to Oklahoma's.' 0 6 In Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance
Co.,107 the Kansas Supreme Court held that because the legislature had pro-
vided such detailed relief in recognition of the need to protect insureds, the
judiciary should not expand that relief."1 By accepting the legislature's remedy,
98. 36 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1221-28 (1986).
99. 36 OKCLA. STAT. §§ 1251-60 (1986).
100. Even if a private action were allowed, plaintiffs might be stymied by the requirement
that the misconduct be habitual enough to constitute a business practice. Hanson, Outline, ALI-
ABA Video Law Review, Bad Faith Insurance Litigation 4 (January 19, 1989).
101. 36 OKLcA. STAT. § 1258 (1986).
102. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1226 (1986).
103. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1219 (1986).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Combs v. Insurance Co. of II1., 146 I11. App. 3d 957, 497 N.E.2d 503 (1986),
cert. denied (1986) (insurance code preempted action which had been allowed previously under
common law tort theory); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501,
431 A.2d 966 (1981) (statutory remedy sufficient, although it is administrative remedy only).
But see Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987),
reh'g denied (1987), review denied 523 S. 2d 578 (1988) (insurance code provides civil tort action
by any person damaged by insurer's bad faith).
106. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2401 to 2414 (1986).
107. 611 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1980).




the Kansas court avoided a conflict such as that between Christian and
Rodgers.'
09
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court does intend to limit special protection to
the insurance context, the legislative remedy should be used. Particularly if
coupled with the contract remedies described below, the legislative remedy
could adequately protect Oklahoma's insureds while leaving other contracts
free from uncertainty. '
Contract Remedies
Instead of expanding the definition of a tort, some states seek to protect
insureds by generously defining contract damages.' In Beck v. Farmers In-
surance Exchange,"2 the Utah Supreme Court noted that while the policy
limits define the amount payable for performance of the contract, they do
not define liability for breach." 3 The court recognized that the loss of a home
or business or even bankruptcy could be a foreseeable consequence of failure
to pay proceeds promptly."' Damages for mental distress might be awarded
in the unusual case."15
This remedy addresses the concern that if an insurer is liable only for the
policy benefits, it has no incentive to pay those benefits promptly.", The
remedy is also consistent with Oklahoma statutes. One Oklahoma statute allows
contract damages "for all the detriment proximately caused" by a breach
or which would be likely to result from a breach." 7 Damages must be "clearly
ascertainable in both their nature and origin. '""I A second statute may ap-
pear to limit contract damages to the policy proceeds: "The detriment caused
by the breach of an obligation to pay money only is deemed to be the amount
109. But see Note, Torts-Insurance-First Party Bad Faith-Is There an Adequate Remedy
in Kansas After Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co.?, 29 U. KAN. L. R v. 277 (1981).
110. A California Supreme Court justice remarked that in the almost thirty years California
has had an unfair practices act in its Insurance Code, not a single case in which the insurance
commission enforced the Act has been reported in California Appellate Reports or the California
Reporter. Moradi-Shalel, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 135 (1988) (Mack,
J., dissenting). Although one would not expect to find administrative actions in these reporters,
his point is well taken-for a statutory remedy to be effective, it must be aggressively enforced.
111. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parkinson, 487 N.E.2d 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985),
reh'g denied, 491 N.E.2d 229 (1986) (contractual remedy allowing compensatory damages suffi-
cient); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978) (con-
tract damages not limited to policy proceeds; consequential damages from fire were foreseeable
and ascertainable); Freemon, Reasonable and Foreseeable Damages for Breach of an Insurance
Contract, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 108 (1985).
112. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
113. Id. at 801.
114. Id. at 802.
115. Id. Ordinary disappointment, frustration or anxiety would not be sufficient. Id. at 802 n.6.
116. See Note, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis,
39 STAN. L. Rav. 161, 169-71 (1986).
117. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 21 (1981).
118. Id.
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due by the terms of the obligation, with interest thereon."" 9 However, it is
more straightforward to reconcile this statute with expanded contract remedies
than with tort remedies. 2 ° The contract duty to perform in good faith is in-
deed separate from the contract duty to pay money. Either duty may be
breached independently of the other, or they may be breached together."'
However, this remedy does not allow punitive damages because Oklahoma
forbids punitive damages in contract.'22
California's Refinement of the Tort Remedy
California's tort for breach of the duty of good faith is in a state of flux.
As the analysis of Rodgers illustrates, it is not easy to define when this tort
should and should not be applied. California has extended the tort to con-
tracts with "similar characteristics" to those of insurance contracts. 23 A
California appellate court defined those similar characteristics:
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently
unequal bargaining positions;
(2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a non-profit
motivation, i.e., to secure peace of mind, security, future protection;
(3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate because (a) they
do not require the party in the superior position to account for
its actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party "whole";
(4) one party is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm
it may suffer and of necessity, places trust in the other party to
perform; and
(5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability.
24
However, this apparently simple solution is not without flaw. The freedom
to breach a contract without risk of tort liability is a cornerstone of contract
law which should not be casually overturned.' 2 For example, there could be
119. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 22 (1981).
120. The Christian court rejected the insurer's argument that only the obligation to pay money
had been violated. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903.
121. Consider bad-faith delayed payment (breach of good faith, but not breach of the duty
to pay money), good-faith withholding of benefits (breach of the duty to pay money, but not
breach of good faith), and bad-faith refusal to pay money (breach of both duties).
122. See 23 Osc.A. STAT. § 9 (1986); 23 OKLA. STAT. § 21 (1981).
123. Seamen's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158,
1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). See also Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a Nonin-
surance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IowA L. REv. 893 (1986); Case Comment, Sailing the
Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69
MwN. L. REV. 1161 (1985).
124. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Ca. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1984).
125. For an economic analysis of the consequences of expanding tort liability, see generally
Note, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN.




serious drawbacks to widespread use of these criteria for two other types of
contracts which also might be especially vulnerable to tort liability: employ-
ment contracts and consumer lending contracts.
Concern has been expressed that if tort liability were imposed for breach
of an employment contract, the duty of good faith could create a duty not
to terminate employment, thereby effectively eliminating termination-at-will.26
An additional concern is that every decision to fire an employee, normally
a relatively simple business decision, could subject the employer to a jury
trial.' A recent Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Hinson v. Cameron,'8 ap-
pears to be Rodgers' counterpart in the employment context, similarly limiting
application of the duty of good faith in employment contracts. That court
noted that to do otherwise would "subject each discharge to judicial incur-
sions into the amorphous concept of bad faith."'2 9 Even California, which
started the trend, 130 has recently held that a terminated employee may only
recover in contract.1
3 '
Furthermore, lenders are similarly concerned not only about the potential
tort liability, but also about the possibility that what are now simple actions
for judgment for debts could routinely become jury trials if the debtors
counterclaimed for breach of the duty of good faith."2 .
ing Recognition of Extra-Contract Damages, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1421 (1986) (guidelines for applica-
tion of the tort).
126. See generally Note, Employers and Employees: Hinson v. Cameron: Dimming the "Hall
Light" on Oklahoma's "Revised" Employment-at-Will Doctrine? 41 O, .A. L. REv. 314 (1988);
Tepker, Oklahoma's At-Will Rule: Heeding the Warnings of America's Evolving Employment
Law?, 39 OQ.A. L. REv. 373 (1986).
127. A better understanding of the nature of the duty of good faith should make this fear
groundless. The duty of good faith attaches only to contract provisions. If there is no duty to
retain an employee, there can be no duty to retain the employee in good faith.
128. 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987). Hinson held that an employer does not have a legal duty
not to terminate an at-will employee in bad faith, even if there is an implied duty of good faith.
Id. at 554. More recently, in Burk v. K-Mart, 60 OKLA. B.J. 305, 306 (1989), the court's em-
phatic answer to certified questions was that there is no duty of good faith in employment-at-will
contracts. If this holding were taken literally, at-will employees could find themselves at the
mercy of their employers in all areas of their employment. The holding emphasizes again that
the court does not understand the tort it has created.
129. Hinson, 742 P.2d at 554.
130. See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
131. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988) (no tort for had-faith breach of termination-at-will clause in employment contract).
132. See generally Pierce & Harrell, Financers as Fiduciaries: An Examination of Recent Trends
in Lender Liability, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 79 (1989); Oklahoma Bankers Association & Oklahoma
Bar Association, Critical Issues in Today's Banking, Pub. No. 309, Sept. 16, 1988 (recent
developments); Bahls, Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liabili-
ty, 48 MONT. L. REv. 213 (1987) (application of the principle to acceleration, demands for more
collateral, loan negotiations); Flick & Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls
and Protections, 103 BANKINo L.J. 220 (1986) (definition of the liability); Lawrence & Wilson,
Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63 IND.
L.J. 825 (1988) (application of Uniform Commercial Code's Article I good faith definition to
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Conclusion
Oklahoma courts have created a tangled web by attempting to address policy
concerns in a piecemeal fashion, Traditional distinctions between tort and con-
tract have been rejected. This approach leaves the majority of contracting
parties in a state of uncertainty. Rodgers, instead of clarifying the situation,
may have made it worse. Some contracting parties are subject to tort liability
for breach of their contracts, while other contracting parties with similar policy
concerns are not. At this point, the relevant distinctions are not clear.
Only insurers and commercial lenders now know their vulnerability to this
tort liability. Insurers know that all their contracts are vulnerable, whether
individual or commercial. Lenders know that their commercial loan transac-
tions are free from tort liability, whether with a sophisticated or an un-
sophisticated customer. Lenders may speculate about their individual customer
relationships: on one hand, the policy concerns of Christian should apply;
on the other hand, Rodgers implies that Christian may be limited to insurance
contracts.
The supreme court created this confusion in its attempt to protect insureds
who lack bargaining power in contracts with their insurers. However, the
legislature has now spoken to that same concern and provided statutory
remedies. If the court were to bow to the legislature's remedies, a contract
could again be a contract.
Carolyn S. Smith
banks); Hilfinger, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing and the Implied
Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 539 (1987) (subjective and objective good faith obliga-
tions under the Uniform Commercial Code); Harrell, The Bank-Customer Relationship: Evolu-
tion of a Modern Form, II OK.A. Crn, U. L. Rav. 641 (1986) (detrimental reliance may be
the focus of the expanding tort).
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